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On the Performance Evaluation of Encounter-based 
Worm Interactions Based on Node Characteristics 
 
 
Abstract: An encounter-based network is a frequently-
disconnected wireless ad-hoc network requiring nearby 
neighbors to store and forward data utilizing mobility and 
encounters over time. Using traditional approaches such as 
gateways or firewalls for deterring worm propagation in 
encounter-based networks is inappropriate. Because this 
type of network is highly dynamic and has no specific 
boundary, a distributed counter-worm mechanism is 
needed. We propose models for the worm interaction 
approach that relies upon automated beneficial worm 
generation to alleviate problems of worm propagation in 
such networks. We study and analyze the impact of key 
mobile node characteristics including node cooperation, 
immunization, on-off behavior on the worm propagations 
and interactions. We validate our proposed model using 
extensive simulations. We also find that, in addition to 
immunization, cooperation can reduce the level of worm 
infection. Furthermore, on-off behavior linearly impacts 
only timing aspect but not the overall infection. Using 
realistic mobile network measurements, we find that 
encounters are non-uniform, the trends are consistent with 
the model but the magnitudes are drastically different. 
Immunization seems to be the most effective in such 
scenarios. These findings provide insight that we hope 
would aid to develop counter-worm protocols in future 
encounter-based networks. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
An encounter-based network is a frequently-
disconnected wireless ad-hoc networks requiring close 
proximity of neighbors, i.e., encounter, to disseminate 
information. Hence, we call this the “encounter-based 
network” which can be considered as a terrestrial delay-
and-disruptive-tolerant network. It is an emerging 
technology that is suitable for applications in highly 
dynamic wireless networks.  
 Most previous work on worm propagation has 
focused on modeling single worm type in well-connected 
wired network. However, many new worms are targeting 
wireless mobile phones. The characteristics of worms in 
mobile networks are different from random-scan network 
worms. Worm propagations in mobile networks depend 
heavily on user encounter patterns. Many of those worms 
rely on Bluetooth to broadcast their replications to 
vulnerable phones, e.g., Cabir and ComWar.M [16]. Since 
Bluetooth radios have very short range around 10-100 
meters, the worms need neighbors in close proximity to 
spread out their replications.  Hence, we call this 
“encounter-based worms”. This worm spreading pattern is 
very similar to spread of packet replications in delay 
tolerant networks [18, 22], i.e., flooding the copies of 
messages to all close neighbors. An earlier study in 
encounter-based networks actually used the term “epidemic 
routing” [18] to describe the similarity of this routing 
protocol to disease spreading.  
Using traditional approaches such as gateways or 
firewalls for deterring worm propagation in encounter-
based networks is inappropriate. Because this type of 
network is highly dynamic and has no specific boundary, a 
fully distributed counter-worm mechanism is needed. We 
propose to investigate the worm interaction approach that 
relies upon automated beneficial worm generation [1]. This 
approach uses an automatic generated beneficial worm to 
terminate malicious worms and patch vulnerable hosts.   
Our work is motivated by wars of Internet worms such 
as the war between NetSky, Bagle and MyDoom [13]. This 
scenario is described as “worm interactions” in which one 
or multiple type of worm terminates or patches other types 
of worms. In [14, 15], we have classified worm interaction 
types. However, this is the first study on the effect of 
fundamental characteristics of node behavior on worm 
propagation.  
There are many important node characteristics to be 
considered, but we focus only a fundamental subset 
including node cooperation, immunization and on-off 
behavior. We shall show that these are key node 
characteristics for worm propagation in encounter-based 
networks. Other characteristics such as trust between users, 
battery life, energy consumption, and buffer capacity are 
subject to further study and are out of scope of this paper. 
The majority of routing studies in encounter-based 
networks usually assume ideal node characteristics 
including full node cooperation and always-on behavior. 
However, in realistic scenarios, nodes do not always 
cooperate with others and may be off most of the time [26]. 
In worm propagation studies, many works also assume all 
nodes to be susceptible (i.e., not immune) to worm 
infection. An immune node does not cooperate with 
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infected hosts and is not infected. To investigate more 
realistic scenarios, we propose to study the mobile node 
characteristics and analyze the impact of node cooperation, 
immunization and on-off behavior on the worm 
interactions. Cooperation and on-off behavior are expected 
to have impact on the timing of infection. Intuitively, 
cooperation makes the network more susceptible to worm 
attacks. Immunization, however, may help reduce overall 
infection level. This paper examines the validity of these 
expectations, using the overall infection level and timing of 
infection as metrics (see Section 3.C). 
Most worm propagation studies only focus on 
instantaneous number of infected hosts as a metric. We feel 
that additional systematic metrics are needed to study 
worm response mechanisms. We utilize new metrics 
including total infectives, maximum infectives, total 
lifespan, average lifespan, time-to-infect-all, and time-to-
remove-all to quantify the effectiveness of worm 
interaction. 
 In this paper, we try to answer following questions: 
How can we model this war of the worms systemically 
based on node characteristics including cooperation, 
immunization, and on-off behavior in encounter-based 
networks? What conditions of node characteristics can 
alleviate the level of worm infection?  This worm 
interaction model can be extended to support more 
complicated current and future worm interactions in 
encounter-based networks. Due to limited space, we only 
model node characteristics on aggressive one-sided worm 
interactions [14] in which there are two types of worms; 
beneficial worm and malicious worm. The beneficial worm 
acts as a predator and can terminate the malicious worm (in 
this case, the prey!). The predator vaccinates and patches 
infected hosts and susceptible hosts to prevent infection 
and re-infections from malicious worm. 
Our main contributions in this paper is our proposed 
new Worm Interaction Model focusing on node 
characteristics in encounter-based networks. We also use 
new metrics to quantify the effectiveness of worm 
interactions, and are applicable to study any worm 
response mechanism. We also provide the first study of 
worm propagation based on real mobile measurements. 
Following is an outline of the rest of the paper. We 
discuss related work in Section 2. Then, in Section 3, we 
explain the basic worm interaction model, node-
characteristics model, and proposed metrics. Then we 
analyze worm interactions in both uniform and realistic 
encounter networks. In Section 4, we conclude our work 
and discuss the future work. 
 
2. Related work 
 
Worm-like message propagation or epidemic routing 
has been studied for delay tolerant network applications 
[18, 22]. As in worm propagation, a sender in this routing 
protocol spreads messages to all nodes in close proximity, 
and those nodes repeatedly spread the copies of messages 
until the messages reach a destination, similarly to generic 
flooding but without producing redundant messages. 
Performance modeling for epidemic routing in delay 
tolerant networks [22] based on ODEs is proposed to 
evaluate the delivery delay, loss probability and power 
consumption. Also the concept of anti-packet is proposed 
to stop unnecessary overhead from forwarding extra 
packets copies after the destination has received the 
packets. This can be considered as a special case of non-
zero delay of aggressive one-sided interaction which we 
consider in our model. 
Epidemic models, a set of ordinary differential 
equations, were used to describe the contagious disease 
spread including SI, SIS, SIR SIRS, SEIR and SEIRS 
models [3, 9, 17] in which S, I, E, R stand for Susceptible, 
Infected, Exposed and Recovered states, respectively. 
There’s an analogy between computer worm infection and 
disease spread in that both depend on node’s state and 
encounter pattern. For Internet worms, several worm 
propagation models have been investigated in earlier work 
[4, 7, 11]. Few works [8, 12, 14, 15] consider worm 
interaction among different worm types. Our work, by 
contrast, focuses on understanding of how we can 
systemically categorize and model worm propagation 
based on node characteristics in encounter-based networks.  
In [1], the authors suggest modifying existing worms 
such as Code Red, Slammer and Blaster to terminate the 
original worm types. The modified code retains portion of 
the attacking method so it would choose and attack the 
same set of susceptible hosts. In this paper, we model this 
as aggressive one-sided worm interaction. Other active 
defenses, such as automatic patching, are also investigated 
in [19]. Their work assumes a patch server and overlay 
network architecture for Internet defense. We provide a 
mathematical model that can explain the behavior of 
automatically-generated beneficial worm and automatic 
patch distribution using one-sided worm interaction in 
encounter-based networks. Our work aims to understand 
and evaluate automated worm (with patch) generation but 
we do not address details of vulnerabilities nor related 
software engineering techniques to generate patches or 
worms. Active defense using beneficial worms is also 
mathematically modeled in [12] which focused on delay-
limited worm defense in the Internet. 
Effect of Immunization on Internet worms was 
modeled in [10] based on the SIR model. 
 
3. Worm Interaction Models and Metrics 
Worm interaction arises in scenario where one worm 
terminates other worms. To understand worm interaction, 
we start by examining the concept of the predator-prey 
relationships in Section A. Then, in Section B, we 
introduce the basic concept of worm interaction model and 
finally we propose new metrics in Section C. In Section D, 
we provide basic worm interaction model analysis. Then 
we introduce concept of node characteristics and node-
characteristic-based worm interaction model in Section E. 
Then, in Section F, we analyze and compare simulation 
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results between uniform and non-uniform (trace-based) 
worm interactions. 
A. Predator-Prey Relationships 
 
For every worm interaction type, there are two basic 
characters: Predator and Prey. The Predator, in our case 
the beneficial worm, is a worm that terminates and patches 
against another worm. The Prey, in our case the malicious 
worm, is a worm that is terminated or patched by another 
worm
1
.  
A predator can also be a prey at the same time for 
some other type of worm. Predator can vaccinate a 
susceptible host, i.e., infect the susceptible host (vaccinated 
hosts become predator-infected hosts or predator 
infectives) and apply a patch afterwards to prevent the 
hosts from prey infection. Manual vaccination, however, is 
performed by a user or an administrator by applying 
patches to susceptible hosts. 
A termination refers to the removal of prey from 
infected hosts by predator; and such action causes prey 
infectives to become predator infectives. The removal by a 
user or an administrator, however, is referred to as manual 
removal. For brevity and clarity, manual vaccination and 
removal are not considered in this paper. 
We choose to use two generic types of interacting 
worms, A and B, as our basis throughout the paper. A and B 
can assume the role of predator or prey depending on the 
type of interactions.   
B.   Worm Interaction Model 
 
Let S be the number of vulnerable hosts that are not 
yet infected by any worm, i.e. susceptible at time t.  Let 
AI and BI be the number of infected hosts by prey and 
predator at time t, respectively. Assume that each user 
encounters another random user with constant pair-wise 
contact rate β (probability per unit of time of encounter 
between any pair) and uniform encounter (every node has 
equal chance to encounter any other node)
2
. We also 
assume that node’s characteristic including cooperation, 
immunization and on-off behavior does not change after 
infection from prey or predator. We start with the simple 
case where every node is cooperative, susceptible and 
always on.  The state transition diagram in fig.1 and the 
susceptible rate and infection rates of prey and predator are 
given by: 
 
)( BA IIS
dt
dS
+−= β         (1-a) 
)( BA
A ISI
dt
dI
−= β          (1-b) 
)( BAB
B IISI
dt
dI
+= β .         (1-c) 
                                                 
1 Note that in other models the malicious worm may also be a 
predator, and can be studied similarly. We do not present such 
study for the lack of space. 
2 This assumption is relaxed later in the paper in the trace-
based encounter simulations. 
ASIβ BAIIβ
BSIβ
 
Figure 1: Aggressive one-sided interaction  
 
We call this set of equations “aggressive one-sided 
interaction model” where a predator is able to terminate its 
prey and vaccinate susceptible hosts. We shall vary this 
model later to capture various node characteristics. 
 
C. Metrics 
 
To gain insight and better quantify the effectiveness of 
aggressive one-sided worm interaction, we propose to use 
the following metrics:  
 
(1) Total Infectives (TI): the number of hosts ever 
infected by prey. 
(2) Maximum Infectives (MI): the peak of 
instantaneous number of prey-infected hosts 
where TIMII A ≤≤)0( .  
(3) Total Life Span (TL): the sum of time of individual 
nodes ever infected by prey. It can be interpreted as 
the total damage by prey. 
(4) Average Individual Life Span (AL): the average 
life span of individual prey-infected hosts 
where TLAL ≤ . 
(5) Time to Infect All (TA): the time required for 
predator to infect all susceptible and prey hosts. Its 
inverse can be interpreted as average predator 
infection rate. 
(6) Time to Remove All (TR): the time required for 
predator to terminate all preys where TATR ≤ . Its 
inverse can be interpreted as prey termination rate. 
 
Our goal is to find the conditions to minimize these 
metrics based on node characteristics. We discuss details 
of node characteristics in Section E. 
Next we examine the basic worm interaction model 
and its relationships with above metrics. 
 
D.   Basic Model Analysis 
If we want to suppress the initial infection (
dt
dI A =0 at 
t=0), from (1-b), then the required condition for this is 
 
BI (0) = S (0)           (2) 
where BI (0) and S (0) are the number of prey-infected 
hosts and susceptible hosts at t=0 respectively. 
We obtain from this condition that  
 
T I = MI = AI (0), )(∞AI = 0  (3) 
         Susceptible                    Infected with                     Infected with 
                                                 Worm A, Prey                Worm B, Predator,              
                                                                                       Immune to Worm A 
 4 
where  )(∞AI is the number of prey-infected hosts at t=∞ . 
However, we can see from (2) that the threshold can 
only be obtained by requiring the initial number of 
predator to be at least equal to number of susceptible hosts 
(a trivial condition). If that condition cannot be met, 
i.e., )0()0( SI B < , then we can only have certain 
acceptable level of infection and TI can be derived from 
∫
∞
=
=
0t
AdtSITI β                         (4) 
MI can be found where 
dt
dI A =0 at t > 0, in which  
BI (t) = S (t)   (5) 
 
Let Y be the initial infected host ratio which is a ratio 
of predator initial infected hosts to prey initial infected 
hosts, i.e.,
)0(
)0(
A
B
I
I
Y =  where )0(0 SNY −<< and N is the 
total number of nodes in the network.  
In figures 2, 3 and 4, we show the metrics 
characteristics based on Y and validate our models through 
the encounter-level simulations. We simulate and model 
1,000 mobile nodes with β = 6x10-6 sec-1, 1)0( =AI , and 
998),0(1 ≤≤ SI B . Each simulation runs at least 1,000 
rounds and we plot the mean values for each Y.  
We assume uniform and constant β  as well as )0(AI . 
We adjust Y to find the optimal range to minimize our 
proposed metrics where Ymin = 1 and Ymax = 998. 
In Fig.2, we show the relationships of TI and MI as the 
function of Y.  TI and MI decrease exponentially as Y 
increases. The reason we still keep )0(AI  small is to have 
wider range of Y with the same size of N. MI (as a fraction 
of N) is more accurately predicted by the model. The ratio 
of TI to MI is constant but it gets smaller towards the 
largest Y. We also find that if )0(:)0(:)0( AB IIS  is 
constant then NMI : and NTI : are also constant even N 
changes. 
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Figure 2: Relationships of TI and MI with Y  
 
Because TL is the accumulated life of individual prey 
until the last prey has been removed by predator whose 
duration indicated by TR. we can simply derive TL based 
on the numerical solutions from (1-b) as follows: 
tITL
ot
tA
∆=∑
∞
=
                    (6) 
Since AL is the average life span for each node that 
has been terminated by predator which is equal to the 
number of nodes that are ever infected, AL can be derived 
from 
TI
TL
dtSI
TL
dtII
TL
AL
t
A
t
BA
===
∫∫
∞
=
∞
= 00
ββ
             (7) 
TL and AL trends are mostly accurately predicted by 
the model. The AL errors are due to the errors of estimated 
TL. 
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Figure 3: Relationships of TL and AL with Y 
 
From Fig.3, TL decreases exponentially as Y 
increases. AL, on the other hand, is almost constant for all 
Y. It is interesting to see that TL and AL are merging at 
their minimum when Y = Ymax. As we can see that TLmin 
and ALmin do not reach zero at Ymax because the next 
encounter time of a prey-infected host with any of 
predator-infected host ( )0(BI ) requires average of 
β)0(
1
BI
. Furthermore, from (7), TLmin = TIminALmin, TLmin 
and ALmin merge to each other because TImin = )0(AI  = 1. 
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Figure 4: Relationships of TA and TR with Y 
 
From the observation in Fig.4, TR reduces much faster 
than TA with the increase of Y. TR decreases exponentially 
as Y increases. TA starts to be reduced rapidly when Y ≈  
Ymax. At Ymax, we can see that TAmin=TRmin=ALmin, 
Note that TA is also similar to the average time for 
every node to receive a copy of a message from a random 
source in an encounter-based network which can be 
derived as βNN /)5772.0ln2( +  [24].  
 
E.   Node characteristics 
 
Earlier we assume that all nodes are fully cooperative, 
susceptible to both prey and predator and “always-on” in 
Section B., and hence each encounter guarantees a 
successful message (worm) transfer.  
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AISp *β BAIIpβ
BISp *β
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Figure 5: Aggressive one-sided interaction with node characteristics 
 
In this section, we investigate the scenarios that do not 
follow above assumptions regarding these three important 
node characteristics. We assume these characteristics are 
consistent through out its life time of the networks. 
 
(1) Cooperation:  
 
Cooperation is the willingness of node to forward the 
message (worm) for other nodes. The opposite 
characteristic is known as selfishness. Intuitively, 
cooperation may seem to make the network more 
vulnerable. However, unlike immunization, cooperation is 
expected to equally slow down both prey and predator 
propagations. Hence, the effect of cooperation is hard to 
anticipate. 
 
(2) Immunization:  
 
 Not all nodes are susceptible to the prey either 
because of their heterogeneous operating systems and their 
differences of promptness to remove the vulnerability from 
their machines. Hence partial of nodes can be immune to 
prey and will slow down the overall prey infection. It is 
expected to improve the overall targeted metrics that we 
mention earlier. Because even some nodes are immune to 
the prey but they still help forwarding the predator to other 
nodes and it is expected to have no positive impact on AL, 
TA but reduce TL and TR simply because of less number of 
nodes to be removed. 
 
(3) On-off behavior: 
 
A node is able to accept or forward the packet based 
on the on-off characteristics. In reality, devices are “on” or 
active only a fraction of the time. Activity may be related 
to mobility. For instance, a mobile phone is usually on, 
while lap top is unlikely to be mobile while on
3
. We model 
the transition from on to off, and vice versa, 
probabilistically. The probability is determined at the 
beginning of each time interval. Hence the contact rate is 
expected to be proportionally reduced according to the 
probability that the node cannot forward or accept the 
packets because of on-off status.  
Let c be the fraction of N that are willing to be 
cooperative where 10 ≤≤ c and N is the total number of 
nodes in the networks. Let i be the fraction of cooperative 
                                                 
3 This is observed from measurements [25, 26] and is captured 
in our study using trace-driven simulations. 
nodes that are immune to prey where 10 ≤≤ i . We assume 
that initial predator and prey hosts are cooperative then the 
number of susceptible hosts for both prey and predator is 
S* where )0()1()0(* AINicS −−=  and number of 
susceptible hosts for predator only is S’, where 
)0()0(' BIciNS −= . Note that BA IISSN +++= '*  and 
'* SSS += . We define the probability of “on” behavior as 
p and “off” behavior as 1-p where 10 ≤≤ p . Hence contact 
rate for both predator and prey is βp .  
Based on these definitions, the node-characteristic-
based aggressive one-sided model can be shown as 
follows: 
)(*
*
BA IISp
dt
dS
+−= β                      (8-a) 
BISp
dt
dS
'
'
β−=                             (8-b) 
)*( BA
A ISIp
dt
dI
−= β                         (8-c) 
))'*(( BAB
B IIISSp
dt
dI
++= β               (8-d) 
Similarly to Section D, We use this model to derive 
metrics that we are interested. The differences between the 
conditions of this model and that of basic model to 
minimize the metrics are investigated here. 
If we want to suppress the prey initial infection, then 
we need 
)0(*)0( SIB =                               (9) 
 
Assume small )0(AI  and )0(BI  when compared with 
N, hence )0()1()0(* SicS −≈ ; required )0(BI  to stop prey 
initial infection is therefore also reduced approximately by 
the factor of )1( ic − when compared with (2). TI, similarly 
derived to (4), is 
               ∫
∞
=
=
0
*
t
AdtISpTI β                            (10) 
As contact rate is changed due to on-off behavior, TA 
which 1=Y , can be derived as follows: 
TA= βpNN /)5772.0ln2( +                (11) 
Our model can also be used to model node-
characteristic-based one-worm-type propagation which 
equivalent to epidemic routing by 
assigning 0)0( =BI or 0)0( =AI  in (8-a) to (8-d). 
 
F.   Simulation results 
 
    In this section, we start by validating our models with 
uniform-encounter simulation. Then, we compare the 
relationships of node characteristic with our proposed 
metrics in uniform and non-uniform (trace-based) 
encounter networks. 
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(1) Uniform Encounters 
 
We use encounter-level simulations to simulate 
uniform encounter of 1,000 mobile nodes with β  = 6x10-6 
sec
-1
, and 1)0()0( == BA II . Each simulation runs 10,000 
rounds and we plot the median values for each i. The lag 
time between predator and prey initial infection is 0 sec. 
We vary cooperation (c) from 20% to 100%, immunization 
(i) from 0% to 90% with 100% “on” time for the first part 
of experiments (Fig. 6(a)-(f)) and we vary “on” time from 
10% to 90% with 90% cooperation and 10% 
immunization, for the second part (Fig.6(g)-(h)). The first 
part aims to analyze the impact of cooperation and 
immunization on worm interaction whereas the second part 
aims to analyze the on-off behavior.  
From fig. 6 (a)-(f) we find that increase of 
cooperation, surprisingly, reduces malicious worm 
infection for all the metrics. (Note that increase of 
cooperation actually increases absolute TI and absolute MI, 
but relative TI (or TI/ *N ) and relative MI (or MI/ *N ) 
are reduced where number of cooperative-susceptible 
nodes NicN )1(* −= ). 
 Similarly, for immunization fig. 6 (a)-(f) shows that 
immunization reduces all categories of metrics except AL. 
With the increase of immunization, TI is reduced much 
faster than TL, thus increase of immunization increases AL. 
Furthermore, increase of immunization, as expected, 
reduces TR because of less number of possible prey-
infected hosts. 
Cooperation reduces AL and TR significantly than it 
does to other metrics. Immunization, however, reduces 
relative TI, relative MI and TL more significantly than it 
does other metrics. With equal increase (20% to 80%), 
immunization at cooperation = 100% reduces relative TI, 
relative MI and TL approximately 8.8 times, 2.7 times, and 
10.6 times ,respectively, more than cooperation does at 
immunization = 0%. On the other hand, cooperation 
reduces TR approximately 3.3 times more than 
immunization does. As shown in fig. 6(e), unlike 
immunization, only cooperation can reduce TA. 
The impact of on-off behavior (p) is clear in fig. 6 (g) 
and (h). As expected, with variant of “on” time, there is no 
difference in relative TI and relative MI. The ratio of 
contact rate between predator and prey is an indicator of 
the fraction of infected hosts irrespective of the contact 
rate. In this case, the ratio of contact rate is always 1.0, and 
hence the constant of relative TI and relative MI.  
TL, AL TA and TR exponentially decrease with the 
increase of “on” time causing reduction of inter-encounter 
time. Our model shows a good agreement with simulation 
results for most of the scenarios based on node 
characteristics. 
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(g)                                                         (h) 
Figure 6: Effects of cooperation (c), immunization (i) and on-off behavior (p) on uniform-encounter worm interactions 
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Fig. 7 Trace-based statistics and simulation results:  histograms of  (a) total encounter/node and (b) unique encounter/node, and effects on 
cooperation (c), immunization (i) and on-off behavior (p) on (c)TI and MI (d) TL and AL and (e) TR  in non-uniform-encounter worm 
interaction (U: Uniform, NU: Non-uniform, *: contact rate of initial prey is higher, **: contact rate of initial predator is higher) 
(2) Non-uniform Encounters 
 
We investigate the consistency of the model-based 
results with those generated using measurement-based real 
encounters. We drive our encounter-level simulations 
using the wireless network traces of the University of 
Southern California of 62 days in spring 2006 
semester[25]. We define an encounter as two nodes sharing 
the same access point at the same time. We randomly 
choose 1,000 random nodes from 5,000 most active nodes 
based on their online time from the trace. Their median 
β is 1.2x10-6 sec-1and median number of unique encounter 
node is 94. We use )0(AI =1 and )(tIB =1 where t is the 
delay between initial predator-infected host and initial 
prey-infected host in the simulation. This delay was 
introduced as the traced delay between the two groups in 
which one group for initial predator-infected host and 
another for initial prey-infected-host. Each group accounts 
for 3% of total population. The first group has average 
contact rate β =2.7x10-6 sec-1, and the second group has 
average contact rate β =3.6x10-6 sec-1. When contact rate 
of the initial predator-infected host is higher than that of 
the initial prey-infected host, we call this scenario “Fast 
predator”. On the other hand, when contact rate of initial 
predator-infected host is lower than that of prey, we call 
this scenario “Slow predator”. From the trace, the median 
arrival delay between initial predator-infected host and 
initial prey-infected host is -539,795 sec (6.25 days) for 
“Fast predator”, and 539,795 sec for “Slow predator”. For 
comparison between uniform and non-uniform encounter, 
we directly add the plot of metrics from encounter-level 
simulation of worm interaction in uniform encounter 
networks with the same contact rate ( β =1.2x10-6 sec-1) 
and the same number of nodes with arrival delay = 0 sec.  
In fig. 7, we find that immunization (i) is still a very 
important factor to reduce relative TI, relative MI, TL, and 
TR.  However, unlike uniform-encounter worm interaction, 
we find that higher cooperation does not necessarily help 
reduce relative TI, relative MI, TL, AL and TR.  
We believe that because of non-uniform encounter 
patterns (as shown in fig. 7(a)-(b)) and significant lag time 
between an initial prey-infected host and an initial 
predator-infected host, there are several differences of the 
metrics with uniform and non-uniform encounter networks. 
The main reasons of non-uniform contact rate and non-
uniform number of unique contact users are non-uniform 
on-off behavior and location preferences. From [23], there 
(a)                                                 (b) 
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were heavy and light users based on their online time, we 
know that only 50% of users were online more than 20% 
of the whole semester. In fig. 7(a)-(b), we find that user’s 
encounter in the trace is highly skewed, i.e., top 20% of 
user’s total encounter account for 72% of all users’ 
encounter and 70% of users encounter less than 20% of 
total unique users. 
Hence, the metrics of worm interaction in non-uniform 
encounter networks in fig. 7 deviate greatly from the 
results from that of uniform encounter networks. In fig. 
7(c)-(d), relative TI and relative MI with “Slow predator” 
is much worse than that of uniform encounter networks. 
On the other hand, the significant improvement of relative 
TI and relative MI are shown with “Fast predator”.  In fig. 
7(e), TL with “Fast predator” is almost two orders of 
magnitude lower than TL with “Slow predator” but still 
much higher than TL of uniform encounter networks. 
However, as shown in fig. 7(e)-(f), AL with “Fast 
predator” has not shown significant differences than AL 
with “Slow predator”.  
 
4. Summary and Future Work 
In this paper, we propose a node-characteristics-based 
model and metrics as a performance evaluation framework 
for worm interactions in encounter-based networks, with 
focus on cooperation, immunization, and "on-off" 
behavior. We find that in uniform encounter networks, 
immunization is the most influential characteristics for 
total infectives, maximum infectives and total life span. 
Cooperation and on-off behaviors greatly affect average 
individual life span, time-to-infect-all and time-to-remove-
all. Our model also shows a very good agreement with 
uniform-encounter simulation results. 
Based on realistic mobile networks measurements, we 
find that the contact rate and the number of unique 
encounters of users are not uniform. This causes worm 
infection behavior to deviate significantly from that of 
uniform encounter networks, even though the general 
trends remain similar to the model. 
In addition, the level of infection is now determined by 
the contact rate of the initial predator and prey-infected 
hosts. A higher contact rate of initial predator (than prey) 
infected hosts significantly reduces the total infectives and 
maximum infectives when compared to those of the 
opposite scenario. 
In such networks, immunization seems to be more 
important factor than cooperation. Hence, enforcing early 
immunization and having mechanism to find a high-
contact-rate node to use as an initial predator-infected host 
is critical to contain worm propagation in encounter-based 
networks. We believe that node-characteristics model for 
uniform encounter networks can be extended with delay 
and cluster behavior to explain effect of node 
characteristics on worm interaction in non-uniform 
encounter networks of the future. 
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